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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT-WAR AND NATIONAL EMERCOURT JURISDICTION-FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS

GENCY-FEDERAL

CLAUSE-Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 690 F.2d 1010 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
Sergeant Persinger is a United States Marine who was stationed
at the American Embassy in Tehran when it was seized by Iranian
militants on November 4, 1979. Two weeks after the hostages were released, Sergeant Persinger and his parents filed suit against Iran in
federal district court seeking damages for injuries suffered during the
fifteen months he was held in captivity. Pursuant to the executive
agreement reached with Iran terminating such claims, the United
States intervened as a party-defendant and moved to dismiss the suit.
The district court, relying on Dames & Moore v. Regan,' granted the
motion and the court of appeals affirmed.
In arguments before the court of appeals, the plaintiffs urged several grounds for reversal. The first argument advanced was that Executive Order 12,283,1 issued by President Carter under the terms of the
agreement with Iran, was unconstitutional because it attempted to
curb the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In rejecting this interpretation, the court concluded that the executive order did not divest the
federal courts of jurisdiction, but merely defined a rule of law applicable to certain types of claims.
The court then turned to the related jurisdictional issue of sovereign immunity which the United States had raised as a bar to subject
matter jurisdiction in arguments before the district court. On appeal
the government proposed, however, that the court not consider the jurisdictional question on the ground that President Carter had lawfully
settled the claims of the hostages as part of the executive agreement.
The United States claimed, in the alternative, that Iran's immunity
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act 8 warranted dismissal of the
suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
court ruled that consideration of the jurisdictional question could not
be avoided, for if Iran was entitled to sovereign immunity then the
court was without jurisdiction to reach the merits of the suit. The

court further determined that, for the purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, the seizure of the embassy occurred within United
States territory. The reasons underlying this decision were that the
1.
2.
3.

453 U.S. 654 (1981).
46 Fed. Reg. 7927 (1981).
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
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United States exercises concurrent jurisdiction over its embassies and
that the Act does not require that the covered territory be subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." The court also decided
that the seizure could not be construed as discretionary within the
meaning of the Act 5 because the take-over of the embassy violated several treaties6 between the United States and Iran as well as long-established rules of international law.
After deciding that Iran could not claim sovereign immunity in
this case, the court considered the plaintiffs' argument that the President exceeded his constitutional authority under the separation of
powers doctrine by extinguishing a particular class of claims without
express congressional approval. While noting that Congress never explicitly authorized or ratified the President's actions, the court found
that Congress had acquiesced to the executive agreement by failing to
take any contrary action. After acknowledging the deference traditionally accorded executive decisions in the sphere of foreign affairs and
recognizing the need that existed for prompt resolution of the hostage
crisis, the court concluded that the terms of the executive agreement
did not exceed the bounds of presidential authority.
The final argument advanced by the plaintiffs was that the executive agreement should be held invalid under the fifth amendment on
the ground that the termination of private claims against Iran constituted a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Without actually deciding the merits of the takings issue, the
court dismissed plaintiffs' claim on the grounds that the Court of
Claims has jurisdiction to award damages for violations of the takings
clause and that this remedy was available at the time of the alleged
7
taking.
In deciding to dismiss plaintiffs' claim, the court relied extensively on the Supreme Court's decision in Dames & Moore v. Regans
which sustained the executive order suspending commercial claims
against Iran. While the court of appeals noted that Dames & Moore v.
Regan involved the suspension of claims whereas the present case in4. Id. at § 1603 (c).
5. Id. at § 1605 (a)(5).
6. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr.
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261; Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United States--Iran, 8 U.S.T. 901,
T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
7. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
8. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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volved the termination of claims, it emphasized that both suits
stemmed from the same international crisis that the President had resolved with the acquiescence of Congress. In stressing the narrowness
of its holding, the court of appeals merely underscored the conclusion
reached by the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan that further clarification of the limits on the exercise of presidential power in
this area cannot be made in the abstract, but must await events which
have yet to unfold.

FORUM NON CONVENIENS-EFFECT OF LAW OF ALTERNATE FORUM ON

PROPRIETY OF DISMISSAL-Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235

(1981).
In July 1976 a small aircraft crashed in Scotland killing the pilot
and five passengers who were all Scottish subjects and residents. The
plane and its propellers were manufactured in the United States by
Piper Aircraft Company and Hartzell Propeller, Inc. Wrongful death
actions were brought against the two companies by Gaynell Reyno, an
American citizen who was appointed administratrix of the decedents'
estates. The actions were commenced in a California state court and
subsequently transferred to the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania.
Reyno admitted that the suit was brought in the United States
rather than in Scotland because of more favorable laws regarding damages, capacity and liability. Scottish law permits recovery of damages
in products liability actions only if negligence on the part of the manufacturer is established. Strict liability is not recognized in Scotland.
Additionally, Scottish law allows wrongful death actions to be brought
only by a decedent's family.
The district court granted Piper's motion to dismiss the suit on
the ground of forum non conveniens. This decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which held that dismissal was
inappropriate because trial in Scotland would eliminate Reyno's strict
liability claim. The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Marshall, writing
for the majority, held that "the possibility of a change in substantive
law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial
weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry."'
Justice Marshall stressed the need for a flexible approach when
1.

454 U.S. at 247.

